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1 INTRODUCTION
Institutional constraints are frequently the rock on
which the good intentions implicit in linking relief
and development (LRD) founder. All too often,
recommendations to improve such links implicitly
presume institutional capacities in government, do-
nor agencies, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and local organizations which bear no
relation to what is available or possible in the
medium-term.
This article explores the constraints in public in-
stitutions at national level and in civil society
institutions at local level, taking the specific example
of famine induced by the shock of drought in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is important to note that LRD may
be an inappropriate institutional objective in some
circumstances, such as when a disaster is excep-
tional. Nor is it always the desired institutional aim,
given the bureaucratic structures and budgeting
arrangements of many donor agencies which
consciously seek to separate development from
relief. But in the case of one particular aspect of
LRD, famine mitigation, the case for improved
institutional performance is strong.
At least three current debates in development have
direct implications for institutional dimensions to
famine mitigation: the promotion of good govern-
ment; the pursuit of new forms of public administra-
tion; and subsidiarity as a means of bridging the
divide between macro- and micro- level planning
and implementation. Building especially on the
principle of subsidiarity, the article concludes that
the greatest opportunities for overcoming institu-
tional constraints are at the intermediate, or meso
stage where possibilities exist to merge the
strengths of macro-level institutions with opportu-
nities afforded by local level ones.
2 THE PLACE OF FAMINE MITIGATION IN
LINKING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT
Both local and national institutions involved in
famine mitigation can be analysed using a frame-
work based on the actors involved and four stages of
relief and development (see OFDA 1990). Indigenous
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strategies and external interventions may be con-
flicting or complementary. The four stages are as
follows:
1 preparedness (information and diagnosis, con
tingency planning and post-crisis evaluation);
2 mitigation (insurance strategies/interventions,
accumulation and diversification undertaken
before a shock);
3 relief (concurrent strategies/interventions un-
dertaken whilst a crisis is underway, but if
planned for in advance, these can be part of
mitigation activities);
4 rehabilitation (rehabilitation or recovery strate-
gies/interventions undertaken once conditions
begin to return to normal, but again, planned
for in advance).
Neither the relationship between these stages, nor
progression through them, is linear. In situations
where the threat of famine is endemic, the stages are
best conceptualized as part of a continuous cycle in
which shocks or vibrations are part of the 'normal'
portfolio of types of change. The LRD cycle needs to
be understood within the broader development
continuum, implicit in which are overlapping time
frames and the simultaneous pursuit of different
activities of varying duration. Preparedness is taken
as the starting point because it refers to those
informational and diagnostic activities which of ne-
cessity underpin subsequent stages. However, relief
may also run concurrently with mitigation and, to be
effective, rehabilitation would link onto anterior
mitigation activities and inform preparedness for
subsequent episodes of famine. The objective of
these four stages is not, therefore, to create artifi-
cial barriers around sets of activities which may
be almost indistinguishable on the ground, but
instead to indicate that the motivation for and
timing and sequencing of interventions is of
critical importance in forging links between relief
and development.
Actors in this process operate at three levels: the
micro-level (individuals/households in livelihood
systems; community institutions and organizations);
the meso-level (district or provincial government;
NGOs); and the macro-level (national government;
international donors). Using these components, a
matrix for analysing institutional, as well as other
components of the relief/development cycle can
be constructed, as shown in Table 1, which also
gives illustrative examples of the kinds of local level
Table 1: Matrix for linking relief and development with examples of local responses
and policy Instruments
STAGES I
IMICRO
Individuals
& Households
PREPAREDNESS
Information & Use indigenous
diagnosis knowledge e.g.
weather
forecasts
Contingency
ptsnnlri
Poet-crIsIs
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MITIGATION
insurance
strategies!
Interventions
REUEF
Concurrent
strat.glsal
community
REHABIUTATIO
Recovery
strsteglesI
Interventions
Gauge &
Identify how
to Improve
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Assess which
coping
strategies no
longer work
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production &
sources of
income
Change mig-
ration routeS,
use food aid rn
risk manage-
ment ptøn
Shift from
caUtO tO
goats
responses and national level policy instruments which
might be located in the cells.
Policy instruments operate in different parts of the
matrix. For example, community-based safety nets
have only very localized effects, and when functioning
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Communities
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properly, are largely independent of the wider
policy environment. On the other hand,
macroeconomic tools (e.g. market interventions to
stabilize food prices), are concentrated in the hands
of government. Effective famine prevention is likely
to comprise a mixture of policies and interventions
linking different parts of the matrix. Preparedness
(planning ahead) is an essential prerequisite if the
quite complex range of responses which this implies
are to be successfully implemented.
There is great variation between countries in the
relative capacity of different actors. Varying agro-
ecological and politico-economic conditions require
that efforts be concentrated in different parts of the
matrix for particular countries. Where local response
capacity is already highly evolved, it should be
strengthened; elsewhere, reinforcing the role of the
state may be more appropriate. Justas the capacity of
actors varies, so too will the appropriateness of par-
ticular components in the matrix. Where drought
and other shocks are frequent occurrences, emphasis
on preparedness and mitigation is indicated. Where
these occur say once every 50 years, relief measures
may be more sensible, with much less comprehen-
sive preparedness and mitigation, the premium for
such insurance being too high. The framework is not,
therefore, intended to be a hard and fast structure
imposed across a range of widely differing situa-
tions, but as a tool for helping to identify those cells
which should be accorded priority in a given context.
3 INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO FAMINE
MITIGATION
There is a critical difference between the response of
poor people to the risk of famine and that of macro-
level public institutions. Whereas the lattèr tend to
separate relief from development, and to regard
relief as exceptional and plan for it in isolation from
wider developmentconcerns, vulnerable people con-
tinuously balance their own relief needs with longer-
term development ones. As a result, poor people in
marginal environments are consummate risk man-
agers: they know what is happening and have highly
developed portfolios of strategies to plan for and
mitigate adverse consequences of shocks, to cope
when crisis hits and to recover - in part at least - once
conditions return to normal.
Civil society organizations and institutions (e.g. herd-
ers associations, traditional natural resource man-
agement arrangements, informal cooperatives), have
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evolved to reflect and service the risk management
of vulnerable people. Underpinned by a complex set
of local institutional arrangements, the trade-off
between relief and development works, up to a point,
but the most vulnerable households and communi-
ties in sub-Saharan Africa may be reaching a thresh-
old, beyond which their livelihoods cannot be
secured. Activities pursued by local communities
and institutions provide a starting point for identify-
ing ways of reinforcing what people do already, but
the obstacles to so doing should not be underesti-
mated. Reciprocal ties within communities, for
example, become more exploitative as times get
harder; and institutional safety nets break down
as recourse to outsiders, to the market and to
inhabitual sourcesof incomeintensifies (Davies 1993).
If interventions by public institutions are to succeed
in meeting the needs of local people, they need to
complement strategies pursued at household and
community level which are both capable of and
worth reinforcing, as indicated in Table 1. This
necessitates a decentralized, incremental and
participatory approach, yet there is little input
by vulnerable people into decision-making and im-
plementation about famine mitigation and relief.
Building on civil society institutions also requires
realism about the often unequal and highly stratified
nature of such institutions.
Institutional attempts to manage risk at the macro
level are characterized by a quite different set of
concerns from those of vulnerable people. Response
is reactive not proactive. If contingency plans exist1
there is no guarantee that they will be used. When an
emergency response is launched, food aid domi-
nates and there are few examples of tried and
tested flexible response options. Constraints in
public institutions to famine mitigation via the
route of reinforcing what people already do are
manifold. They can be summarized under the
following headings:
3.1 Institutional appropriateness and flexibility
No single institutional arrangement for more effec-
tive famine mitigation would be appropriate to all
countries. Opinions are divided as to whether pur-
pose-built units are best, or whether the emphasis
should be on co-ordinating existing structures more
effectively. Getting the right institutional arrange-
ments cannot be divorced from the priorities set
by contingency planning. Each part of the relief!
development cycle requires different institutional
arrangements and types of resources. These are
rarely available either in sufficient quantity, or of
the required variety and flexibility, to fulfil the
multiple tasks of a phased and appropriate set
of institutional responses. Rigid institutional divi-
sions between sectors further undermine the capac-
ity of institutions involved to respond in the most
appropriate manner. For example, inadequate pri-
mary health care and the inability to respond
quickly to emergency health problems can cancel
out the benefits of emergency food aid.
3.2 Resource availability and entitlement
Related to this is the competition for access to and
uses for scarce resources. Resources for relief are
easier to come by than those for development in
the current climate of declining aid budgets, in
which the proportion of relief expenditure is never-
theless rising. The diversion of resources from devel-
opment to relief can have ripple effects throughout
the policy agendas of both donors and governments,
and people on the development side will seek to
protect their shrinking access to resources through
institutional channels. This can actively conspire
against improved famine mitigation. Furthermore,
there are severe domestic political conflicts of
interest in redirecting scarce resources to highly
vulnerable but marginal groups, often living in
low potential areas, precisely those which would
benefit most from improved preparedness and miti-
gation. Donors too are often reluctant to invest in
such places.
3.3 Planning time trames
Famine mitigation necessitates that institutional
capacities accommodate varying time horizons for
planning and implementation of the different stages.
Institutions can either consciously block this (as in
the case of the need to allocate resources within
financial years, irrespective of the seasonality of
emergencies in the recipient country); or do so more
indirectly, because they lack the flexibility to gear
up certain parts of the institutional machinery and
then to wind them down again on an as-needed
basis. Institutions are rarely capable of responding
to the concerns of vulnerable people to balance
short-term consumption requirements against longer
term liveithood protection. The overwhelming ten-
dency for public relief institutions is to concentrate
on the very short-term. Early warning systems (EWS)
are a good case in point, which almost always
emphasize the current agricultural year and are
rarely capable of taking the longer term view
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about the implications of successive dry years for
the likelihood and severity of famine, and the
difficulties in recovering from it.
3.4 Plann%ng capacity
The often very ambitious goals of famine mitiga-
tion are rarely explicitly linked to existing weak
planning capacities which characterize much of
sub-Saharan Africa. The notion of competent
national authorities is highly problematic, not
least because of the ambiguity concerning who
exercises power over, and who has responsibility
for and legitimacy in, the different aspects of
famine mitigation. Although donors will need to
continue to support planning capacity in the me-
dium-term, this should not be confused with re-
sponsibility, which must be firmly vested in na-
tional government hands, implying the abandon-
ment of political and economic conditionality.
Reinforcing indigenous capabilities is a tall order
given that national planning capacities are often
chronically weak and very difficult to build up
in a hurry. The problems are made worse by institu-
tional amnesia and failure to learn from past
mistakes, including the costs of not being prepared.
Relief operations are evaluated according to their
own intemal logic and need to be justified retrospec-
tively, tending to obfuscate lessons that could be
learned. Evaluations of the failure to respond early
and effectively are rare; post-crisis evaluations of the
impact on livelihoods even more so (Riely 1991).
3.5 Implementation capacity
Implementation capacity must be considerable if
response is to be flexible and appropriate, but is
invariably highly constrained both within the or-
ganizations of the different actors involved and
between the actors themselves. On the relief side,
there is a lack of synchronization between domestic
and international relief systems. National institu-
tional constraints are exacerbated by the tendency
for donors and NGOs to set up parallel structures
in order to deliver relief as fast as possible once
a crisis is underway. Strengthening institutional
capacity i iot usually regarded as pressing a priority
as meeting humanitarian goals. This approach can
have deleterious consequences not only for the
relief operation itself, but also for fragile local
developmental institutions. Far from improving
institutional capacity for the implementation of
subsequent development activities, emergency
operations frequently undermine it (Buchanan-
Smith 1990).
3.6 Sustaining institutional activity
If institutional capacity and activity are tobe strong
and flexible enough to withstand the pressures of
relief and to successfully link relief and develop-
ment, they must be continually reinforced, in times
of plenty as well as dearth. This implies training
of personnel; field testing flexible responses in
advance of emergencies and designing interventions
that can be taken 'off-the-shelf' when needed;
updating plans and evaluating activities; pre-
positioning or advance allocation of resources that
will enable timely response; and involving affected
people. The roots of poor rehabilitation are grounded
in unsuccessful relief and mitigation.
3.7 Consistency with other policies
If policies to mitigate famine, or to link relief and
development in other ways, conflict with wider
policy objectives, conscious or unconscious tactics
within institutions will seek to undermine them. A
clear example is the separation of relief and develop-
ment budgets in donor agencies, which addresses
the policy objective of regarding famines as distinct
emergencies, not to be confused with normal devel-
opment; but which also makes it almost impossible
to pursue coherent policies over time in areas af-
flicted by recurrent emergencies. At national level,
the burden of taxation and other forms of state
extraction from the community can offset many of
the benefits of safety nets and other state insurance
mechanisms, especially if such demands are made
when the value of assets which poor people have
to sell plummets. Yet, few African governments
can afford tax holidays, even if these often happen
by default as famine prone people cannot pay. A
further example comes from the division of labour
between the public and private sectors. Although it
may be a policy objective to reinforce the private
sector, over-reliance on it can spell disaster. In
food emergencies in sub-Saharan Africa, there is a
general over-dependence on often newly liberalized
and rather weak private cereal trading sectors in the
face of substantial production failures which can
undermine the efforts of public institutions.
3.8 Political factors disguised as institutional
constraints
Domestic and external political factors are fre-
quently confused with institutional constraints. Po-
litical conditionality imposed by donors on recipient
governments often seeks to drive a wedge between
relief and development, most obviously when a gov-
ernment is barred from receiving anything other
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than humanitarian aid. Nationally, there are also
major political issues within institutions. Corrup-
tion, for example, is often identified as being a
key stumbling block within weak institutional struc-
tures in developing countries, attributed to the need
to protect certain class interests. But in the case of
civil servants trying to raise income to a minimum
level to support dependants, for example, no amount
of improved institutional capacity will do much to
tackle 'corruption' unless living wages are paid on
a regular basis or alternative forms of political
control are exercised over this group. One of the
most justified criticisms by governments of foreign
NGOsis that they inflate salary expectations amongst
local staff during emergencies and so drain the
most competent people from the civil service and
further fuel dissatisfaction amongst those remaining
in public institutions.
3.9 Institutional constraints and conflict
All institutional weaknesses are exacerbated by ail-
ing economies, political instability and/or war. The
particular institutional constraints encountered in
situations where famine and conflict combine need to
be mentioned, although a thorough analysis of them
is beyond the scope of this short article. They fall into
two categories: those which exist anyway but which
are grossly exaggerated by conflict (e.g. poor logis-
tics); and those which are a direct outcome of the
conflict (e.g. diversion of already scarce and fragile
institutional resources towards the war effort). At
the level of civil society institutions, conflict can have
damaging consequences, not least when communi-
ties are fragmented and scattered or long-standing
conflicts within them are fuelled by external forces.
Rebuilding civil society after a period of conflict can
be a long and uncertain task, but without it rehabili-
tation efforts are likely tQ founder.
4 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
The institutional problems of famine mitigation are
familiar in the wider debates in sub-Saharan Africa
about good government, public administration and
subsidiarity. Recent developments in these fields
also sugge;t some ways forward for famine mitiga-
tion.
4.1 Good government
The good government agenda has sought to under-
stand why it is that the economic doctrine of struc-
tural adjustment and liberalization has failed to
deliver what it promised in sub-Saharan Africa
(see Moore 1993). It has three main components.
First, it is concerned with institutional and civil
service reform, particularly an emphasis on formal
government channels rather than wider issues of
governance, improvement of the performance and
efficiency of public institutions, and decentralization
of those institutions. Famine mitigation implicitly
advocates all of these. Second, the good government
agenda is concerned with support for civil society
institutions. Better linking of relief and development
will necessitate a reinforcement of civil society insti-
tutions, closer to where the action is, just as much as
improved performance of public ones. Third, the
agenda is concerned with the need for greater
accountability, critical as a means of exerting pres-
sure on the various actors involved in LRD to
improve their performance. Current accountability
in relief operations is not to the poor and destitute,
but instead to those who claim to act in their
interests: donors and their constituents; NGOs; or
(often unaccountable) governments. The correlation
between accountable government and effective pub-
lic action has been identified as a central element in
preventing famine in India (Drèze and Sen 1989).
This list indicates the magnitude of the task at hand
when trying to link relief and development. Much of
what goes wrong in emergencies is a reflection of
wider institutional constraints which operate under
normal circumstances, even though they may then
have less devastating and visible consequences. The
solutions proposed by the good government
agenda are concerned with changes in attitudes
and ideologies as much as with concrete proposals
to improve the functioning of public institutions.
They presuppose that better government is the de-
sired outcome of all participating parties, which
currently fail to practise it. Equally, not all actors
share the view that the institutional barriers to fam-
ine mitigation should be overcome: donors may
justify institutional separation on grounds of the
exceptional nature of emergencies; governments may
do so to maximize overall aid receipts; and NGOs
may wish to protect their funding sources from
both the emergency and development budgets of
donors, and so not to encourage too much blurring
of the two.
4.2 New forms of public administration
New forms of public administration also have direct
implications for the institutional aspects of famine
mitigation. These were initially informed by public
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choice theory, which suggested that state ad-
ministrators, far from being dutiful servants of
the public weal, in fact had their own individual
interests, which they pursued at the cost of the
taxpayer or citizen (Murray 1993a: 1).
At least three models of public institutions are criti-
cized by the new approach (Moore 1993). First, is
the justified critique of the Weberian assumption that
administrative systems can be insulated from social
and political relations in which they are embedded.
The Weberian rational bureaucratic machine is a far
cry from the reality of how bureaucracies involved
in relief and/or development operate, especiallygiven
that it is most effective when performing routine
and predictable functions; and is least so in a
climate of uncertainty, when creativity is needed
and when an ability to learn from mistakes is
indicated (ibid.: 68). It is particularly inappropriate
as a model when political interests are being fought
over within and between bureaucracies, often the
case in relief operations, when several bureaucracies
with vastly differing resource bases are pursuing
distinct and often competing objectives.
The second criticism is of approaches to public ad-
ministration derived from private sector models,
which regard organizations, operating in competi-
tive environments, as 'communities'. Again, this
approach does not well reflect how public institu-
tions involved in relief or development operate. As-
sumptions about relationships of mutuality and
solidarity, of a climate of creativity, flexibility,
commitment and direct support, brought about by
highly skilled managers are almost entirely alien
to these institutions and to the climate of crisis
which characterizes emergencies.
The third criticism is of models which regard organi-
zations as disguised self-interest; in other words,
that the energy and resources of formal institutions
are used to pursue the personal goals of staff. These
models are too simplistic adequately to explain the
complexity of institutional operations in either relief
or development contexts, with their cocktail of
humanitarian, political and financial - as well as
self-interested - motives.
The overwhelming message from advocates of new
forms of public administration is that traditional
models can neither adequately describe how public
bureaucracies operate, nor usefully indicate how
they can realistically be reformed. Solutions need to
start with what is available rather than what is
desirable and to build on strengths rather than be-
come bogged down by weaknesses. New forms of
public administration emphasize strategies rather
than plans; flat hierarchies rather than pyramidal
ones; organization as learning rather than as instru-
ment; user centred systems rather than ones based
on passive consumers; and systems which are open
to the interplay between internal and external factors
rather than internally oriented (Murray 1993b: 81).
Much of this resonates with the agenda of famine
mitigation, but these objectives should not hide
the fact that many African countries may need first
to (re)create a public service which meets minimal
'Weberian' requirements to establish overall compe-
tence and accountability (Moore 1993: 74), before
more complex and appropriate systems can be
achieved. Paradoxically, overcoming institutional
constraints to LRD may therefore necessitate the
establishment of a minimal level of apparently
old style bureaucracies before these can then be
reformed to respond to the complex needs of LRD.
4.3 SubsidlarIty: merging the macro and the
micro
This dilemma leads directly to the idea of sub-
sidiarity, as a means of carving out an institutional
half-way house between new forms of public admin-
istration on the one hand and Weberian bureaucra-
cies on the other. Subsidiarity refers to the allocation
of policy-making decisions and implementation tasks
to the lowest possible administrative level. It does
not imply mandatoiy decentralization of all deci-
sion-making and tasks, but instead suggests that
these should be carried out closest to the user or
beneficiary as is feasible (Swift 1994). Thus, deci-
sions by multi-lateral donors regarding global
allocations of food aid cannot reasonably be decen-
tralized to the level of recipient countries or regions
within them; but decision-taking about the timing,
targeting and nature of relief and how it links up
with local development initiatives can and should be.
The case for subsidiarity rests on two planks: first is
that international and national institutions are un-
likely to be able to reform sufficiently fully to meet
the multiplicity of tasks inherent in comprehensive
relief and development management. Their com-
parative advantage lies in creating the (material and
political) conditions under which institutions closer
to the ground can react. Second is that the greatest
scope for building on what already exists and
functions reasonably well in the realm of famine
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mitigation is at local level, within the parameters of
civil society. This capacity is, however, under stress
and limited in its ability to mitigate disasters, so
requires reinforcement from public institutions. For
such support to be appropriate and efficient, it
is likely to occur at sub-national not national level.
5 POLICY OPTIONS
Mitigation and relief strategies do not always fail
and it is useful to consider what has worked. Table 2
summarizes common interventions used in success-
ful episodes of famine mitigation in a number of
countries, where drought has historically been
associated with famine but no longer is (India,
Bangladesh, Botswana, Kenya, Cap Verde and
Zimbabwe). Table 2 also shows the institutional
implications of successful mitigation activities,
indicating the areas on which institutional capacity
building needs to focus. Obviously, such an exercise
would need to be carried out on a country-by-coun-
try basis, but in starting from what has worked in
the past, institutional priorities can be identified. It
is important to note that some of the implications
relate to wider political and economic factors, which
cannot be addressed by institutional reform and/or
capacity building alone. Perhaps most important of
these is the absence of armed conflict.
A major drawback of the proliferation of policy tools
for famine prevention is how to set priorities in
conditions of resource scarcity. Weak planning ca-
pacities risk being spoilt for choice by the array of
instruments. The choice of appropriate mixes of
interventions can be assessed according to criteria
of: scale; consistency with wider policy; speed; cost-
effectiveness; sustainability; equity; and, critically,
institutional feasibility. The principal lessons for
effective food security planning are also relevant
to famine mitigation: integrated planning but inde-
pendent implementation; the importance of a bias
toward action over planning; the value of risk-
taking and innovation; and the importance of
addressing explicitly the need for new modes of
organization in multi-disciplinary team-work
(Maxwell 1990: 6).
In practice, however, decisions about how to inter-
vene are all too often taken on an ad hoc basis,
influenced by what particular donors or NGOs want
or are able to do, with little overall strategy to
coordinate interventions. Coordinated contingency
planning is the way to avoid this, but little attention
[ Table 2: Common elements in cases of successful macro1eve1 famine mitigation
L
ELEMENTS OF MITIGATION
Formal EWS backed up by free press
& active political debate
Government plays predominant role;
donors & NOOs in secondary position
Efficient system of food supply &
distribution, with appropriate
mixture of public & private
measures
Commercial imports
Food aid available on time when
needed
Storage reserves work weu
Traditional 'relief measures
Importent (e.g. direct feeding);
but Implemented before famIne
happons
Successful public works programmes
Source: Based on Longhurst 1992
is paid to the institutional relationships between the
state, civil society institutions and NGOs. Increas-
ingly, there is a tendency to see (foreign) NGOs
as the answer to institutional constraints, at the
extreme by-passing the state altogether in order
to directly 'participate' with local institutions,
raising serious questions about sustainability and
accountability.
This includes helping to adapt farming systems to drought with
improved seeds and other inputs; diversifying production into
household gardens; water harvesting; soil and water conservation;
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INSTITUTIONAL IMPUCATIONS
Greater transparency of Information
(Political accountability)
Strong co-ordination & leadership by
government, based on adequate
planning capacity
Portfolio of pre-planned responses
& means of Implementation
Appropriate licensing &/or foreign
exchange allocation system
Planned food aid shipments & multi-
annual pledging
Small-scale storage (eg. some pro-
positionIng of stocks)
Co-operative management between
government & donors of these
reserves, If supplied by food aid
Contingency planning, early
response, pro-positioning of
resources
Dependent on effective local
bureaucracy
j
If interventions are to succeed, planners need to
recognize the basis on which local people's choices
are made: protecting future livelihoods is as (if not
more) important than sustaining immediate con-
sumption above the minimum for survival. Research
into the characteristics and needs of famine-prone
people is paying off, and a long list of potential
methods of reinforcing local strategies now exists.1
a range of measures to protect livestock production and exchange;
improved food storage; and diversifying off-farm income and
employment opportunities (see OFDA 1990).
No armed conflict (Political stability)
Systematic piloting of different options in a variety of
localities to see what does and does not work is
needed, as well as assessment of whether or not the
economic and environmental sustainability of par-
ticular local strategies can be improved. Mitigation
strategies which help to diversify sources of house-
hold income and so to spread risk, without relying
on unsustainable natural resource exploitation (e.g.
abusive wood cutting), are likely to be the starting
point for effective reinforcement. Once this has
been done, the institutional and resource implica-
tions for national and sub-national policies and
programmes need to be explored. Enlisting the
participation of famine-prone people in this process
is essential: even apparently successful institutional
initiatives to facilitate famine mitigation are based on
inadequate consultation with and participation of
vulnerable people, especially critical in situations
where public institutions are relatively weak.
Progress on the wider agenda of good government
would help to create the conditions under which the
complex institutional needs of famine mitigation,
and improved links between relief and development
more generally, could be met. But it is highly un-
likely that famine mitigation will be the catalyst for
better government, often leaving institutions of gov-
ernment weaker and less ripe for reform in the
aftermath of crisis than at the outset. Similarly,
although the policy prescriptions emanating from
new forms of public administration are clearly con-
sistent with more effective famine mitigation, the
important caveat is that in desperately weak public
bureaucracies, it may be unrealistic to move directly
to the kinds of approach advocated.
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Subsidiarity offers the greatest scope for merging
the LRD agenda with wider policy concerns about
institutional reform. Given the complexity of op-
tions, especially when local strategies are taken into
account, and the institutional barriers which impede
their effective implementation at national level,
scope for merging micro level and macro level
initiatives at the meso level needs to be explored.
It is in this middle ground that local constraints
and opportunities stand the greatest chance of
being systematically addressed, closer to where
crisis hits, but not entirely separate from national
planning and resources. National famine prevention
strategies, by their very nature, are incapable of
being sufficiently finely tuned to fulfil this role.
Subsidiarity seeks to address both the tendency for
over-centralization of planning and resources, as
well as the need to strengthen that which is worth
strengthening.
In advocating an approach based on subsidiarity,
the comparative advantage of existing institutions
and the mismatch between the complexity of what is
needed and current capacity must be tackled. Local
institutions which underpin most community based
strategies vary in their significance, capacity and
potential: some may not be worth or capable of
reinforcement. The same is true at national level. In
both cases, a major drawback of the proliferation of
institutions and plans is a lack of systematic docu-
mentation of what each component can and cannot
do. A country-by-country inventory of existing local
and national institutional capacity is an essential
prerequisite for understanding and reinforcing
local strategies.
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